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Abstract 
 
We empirically investigate the hypothesis that the less transparent (more difficult to value) the 
target’s assets are the more likely it is that the acquiring firm can obtain higher short- and long-
term returns. We analyze a sample of 1,538 friendly acquisitions partitioned in two separate 
dimensions: acquisitions of public versus private firms, and acquisitions of a firm’s assets versus 
acquisitions of a firm’s assets and its management. Using a sample of (nondiversifying) real 
estate transactions with a public REIT as the acquirer, we find that acquisitions of public firms 
have insignificant short-term abnormal returns. Acquisitions of private targets have positive and 
significant short-term abnormal returns. The acquirer’s abnormal returns are higher in both cases 
when the transactions involve acquisition of the target firm’s management. We find parallel 
results when analyzing the acquirer’s Q over the merger year and the three following years. Our 
conclusions are robust to the type of financing (cash, stock, or a combination) used in the 
acquisition. 
 
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; information asymmetry; value of firms 
  
MERGERS AND TARGET TRANSPARENCY        3 
Mergers and Target Transparency 
 In spite of the extensive theoretical and empirical research on mergers, no clear 
consensus has emerged with respect to its motivations or its impact on the acquirer’s 
shareholders. This lack of agreement is surprising, since few areas of corporate finance are as 
important or have been subject to more analysis. 
 Decades of evidence on M&As demonstrates that acquirers experience losses on average, 
especially when taking over public targets (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). Transactions 
involving taking over private targets, however, are found to offer acquirers’ shareholders positive 
and significant announcement abnormal returns (Aktas, de Bodt, & Roll, 2013; Chang, 1998; 
Faccio, McConnel, & Stolin, 2006; Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Waisman, 2014; Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller, 2002; Hansen & Lott, 1996; Officer, 2007; Officer, Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009). 
These studies also proposed various hypotheses to understand this phenomenon, none seems be 
conclusive. 
 The difficulty of explaining such variation is that announcement returns usually reveal 
information about various things, some of which are deal-specific and the other may be related to 
the reevaluation of acquirers (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002, p. 708). Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson 
(2001) argue it is often impossible to isolate various effects and know the reason for the market’s 
reactions to an announcement. 
 By examining acquirers with several M&A deals, Fuller et al. (2002) are able to more 
directly examine the impact of target and deal-specific characteristics. They proposed that the 
liquidity discount, tax, and control effects may explain the positive returns of acquiring private 
targets. Their findings suggest that private firms and subsidiaries are less attractive investment 
and thus less valuable than similar more liquid public firms. Private targets, however, could be 
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good investment because they offer additional benefits to already diversified shareholders 
through helping internalize externalities (Hansen & Lott, 1996). Hansen and Lott (1996) argue 
that if shareholders are diversified and own both shares of acquirers and targets, they do not care 
whether acquirers overpay for shares of listed companies but would demand that managers not 
overpay for unlisted targets. 
 The main purpose of this study is to analyze the short- and long-term performance of 
firms acquiring targets with different degrees of transparency (difficulty in valuation). The 
possibility of achieving success in a merger depends in large part on the acquirer’s ability to 
identify attractive targets. Targets are attractive either because they are undervalued by other 
potential acquirers, or because they might have greater synergies with a specific acquirer. In 
addition, information costs and valuation uncertainty vary by target type and are generally higher 
for acquiring private targets or for acquiring intangible rather than physical assets. 
 We hypothesize that acquiring assets that are less transparent (more difficult to value) 
will lead to higher returns in the long and short run than acquiring assets that are relatively easy 
to value. That is, we assume that the possibility of the acquirer having an informational 
advantage over other potential acquirers will be higher when, for example, the asset is private or 
its assets are less tangible. This informational advantage is reflected in that such hypothesis will 
hold regardless of the payment method. Several studies show that taking over private targets with 
stock yield particularly higher returns because: (i) the risk sharing hypothesis (Fuller et al., 2002 
among others) (ii) the block shareholder hypothesis (Chang, 1998). To distinguish our hypothesis 
from theirs, we argue that acquirers having informational advantage enjoy higher returns 
regardless of the payment method. 
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 Specifically, we analyze acquisitions in two separate dimensions: acquisitions of public 
versus private firms, and acquisitions of a firm’s assets versus acquisitions of a firm’s assets and 
its management. Our hypothesis implies that it should be very difficult to achieve abnormal 
returns or to have a viable informational advantage when the target is publicly traded. 
Conversely, acquiring private firms should offer the acquirer more scope to exploit an 
informational advantage. This potential should be even greater if the target’s assets are more 
difficult to value, which would be the case if the acquisition involved the retention of the target’s 
management. We use the retention of management because it allows us to partition our sample 
by differing degrees of transparency. Our focus is not on the retention of management per se. 
Thus, our hypothesis suggests the following partial ordering of our four categories of 
transactions: the lowest returns should result from acquisitions of a public firm’s physical assets 
only; the highest returns should come from acquiring the management and assets of a private 
company. Returns to acquiring both the management and assets of a public firm, or to acquiring 
the physical assets of a private firm, will fall between these two extremes. 
 We test our hypothesis by examining 1,538 acquisitions from January 1990 to December 
2000. Our time frame ends in 2000 to allow us to compute long-term abnormal returns and 
operating performance. We focus on real estate transactions to avoid industry-specific effects 
and because real estate is an industry in which each of the four types of acquisitions analyzed is 
prevalent. We further specialize our empirical analysis to acquirers that are equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), since they represent the majority of publicly traded real estate assets. 
Although focusing on a single industry might reduce the generality of our results, we believe that 
this restriction has several important advantages over including a broader set of acquirers: (i) it 
allows us to have a well-fitting but parsimonious return-generating model when determining 
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abnormal returns; (ii) since we use Tobin’s Q and accounting measures to evaluate long-term 
performance, we mitigate the distortions in Q and financial ratios that arise from differing risk or 
growth opportunities; (iii) by using the same industry for both target and acquiring firms, we 
ensure that none of our transactions are for diversification motives; (iv) Comment and Schwert 
(1996) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that merger waves are linked to broad economic 
factors, which can be industry-specific (this clustering is apparent in our data). 
 In addition, REIT mergers differ from the typical corporate merger in several important 
ways that lessen the importance of some of the classic corporate merger motives. These 
differences include: (i) Since a REIT’s governance structure (e.g., the high frequency of 
incorporation in management-friendly states such as Maryland) makes hostile acquisitions 
awkward,1 hostile takeovers are extremely rare in this industry. (ii) Real estate mergers are often 
motivated by a desire to acquire the management team. REIT analysts have recognized the value 
of target management in REIT mergers. Schalop (1998a, 1998b) observes that the most 
significant component of a company’s valuation multiple has consistently been the market’s 
perception of management. Investors pay premiums for management teams perceived to be of 
high quality. An example is the following excerpt from the Duke Realty Annual Report of March 
31, 1998. 
In October we acquired Baur Properties in St. Louis and the R.L. Johnson Company in 
Minneapolis. Both are highly regarded organizations that bring to Duke not only high 
quality real estate but also talented and experienced management teams as well. 
In this regard, we are very pleased to now have Tee Baur heading the Duke operation in 
St. Louis and Robb Johnson in charge of our efforts in Minneapolis. The Farro, Baur and 
Johnson transactions benefit the Company far in excess of the value of the assets 
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acquired. Combining the 20 or more years of market experience and relationship building 
of these teams with the efficiency of the Duke delivery system creates a situation where 
the whole truly exceeds the sum of the parts. 
  
 (iii) Public mergers of REITs are typically mergers of equals rather than a large firm 
acquiring a smaller target.2 (iv) It is unlikely that a REIT merger creates any monopolistic power 
since 75 percent of REIT income must come from “passive” real estate investments such as 
rents.3 
 Perhaps the most significant of these advantages is the absence of hostile mergers in our 
sample. This characteristic is important because it eliminates the variations in performance 
arising from the differential pricing of hostile versus friendly mergers.4 It is clear that friendly 
mergers and mergers where target management is retained imply a less intensive level of 
bargaining and a more likely completion of the transaction than a hostile merger would. 
Removing hostile mergers reduces other possible complications. As the theoretical model of 
Schnitzer (1996) shows, the probability of the bidder adopting a hostile versus a friendly 
takeover increases as the synergy gains become less certain, which would be the case with the 
acquisition of management versus the acquisition of physical assets. 
 Our study supports the hypothesis that acquisition performance is linked to the difficulty 
in assessing the target’s value. Acquisitions of public firms have insignificant short-term 
abnormal returns. Acquisitions of private targets have positive and significant short-term 
abnormal returns. Furthermore, these returns are higher when the acquisitions include acquisition 
of the firm’s management. As such, our work extends the short-term performance findings of 
Matsusaka (1993) of the positive benefits of retaining target management to cases where intra-
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industry mergers or public acquisitions are involved. An analysis of Tobin’s Q over the three 
years following the acquisition yields parallel results. In contrast to the findings of Chang (1998), 
Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2008), and Fuller et al. (2002), we find that our conclusions are robust 
to the type of financing (cash, stock, or a combination) used in the acquisition. Furthermore, it 
appears that disciplining managers is not as important a motive for acquisitions in our sample as 
it is in broader industry samples. 
 This study is organized as follows: the section “Background literature” overviews the 
related literature. The section “Data” describes our data set and statistical approach. The section 
“Empirical Results” presents our empirical analysis. The section “Conclusions” concludes. 
 
Background Literature 
 One important fact has emerged from the extensive literature on mergers and 
restructurings: successful mergers are relatively rare events with the acquirer usually suffering 
poor returns, at the time of the announcement as well as in the short and the long-run. Early 
examples include Dodd (1980), Asquith (1983), and Eckbo (1983). Franks, Harris, and Titman 
(1991) find no significant abnormal returns in the three-year period following the completion of 
the merger. In a complementary study, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1996) find that neither 
firm size, nor beta, nor a slow adjustment of the market to the merger event explains this long-
run, post-merger underperformance of acquirers. They also find that underperformance of 
acquirers is worse in non-conglomerate mergers than in conglomerate mergers. Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) show that the long-term returns of acquisitions financed by stock are significantly 
negative, but cash-financed transactions’ returns are significantly positive.5 Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback (1992), show that the acquirer’s higher productivity leads to improvements in operating 
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cash flow performance.6 Fee and Thomas (2004) also find evidence of increased productive 
efficiency in horizontal mergers. Conversely, Gosh (2001) using a sample of mergers from 1981 
to 1995, finds no evidence of improved operating performance after a merger. Rosen (2005) 
shows that the long-term stock price performance of acquirers is lower for transactions done in 
hot merger or stock market periods. Finally, the interpretation of the stock price reaction to a 
takeover has been questioned (see, Hietala, Kaplan, & Robinson, 2002; Krainer, 2012). In 
addition, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Brav (2000) describe the significant methodological 
difficulties associated with long-term performance studies based on stock prices. 
 Many reasons have been proposed to explain this inability to consistently achieve 
shareholder gains. These include: market efficiency (through large takeover premiums markets 
force acquirers to pay a fair price for the target); hubris (mergers are motivated by factors other 
than increasing shareholder value, see Roll, 1986); acquirers overestimate their ability to achieve 
projected synergies or economies of scale; etc. 
 Researchers have found, however, that mergers have been successful either when private 
firms are acquired (depending on how the merger is financed) or when the acquisition involves 
retaining management of the target, although conflicting evidence exists on the latter type of 
merger. Little or no research has examined the relative performance of firms acquiring targets 
with different degrees of transparency. The management literature (e.g., Chi, 1994; Coff, 1999, 
2002) addresses the issue of the valuation uncertainty inherent in the acquisition of human 
capital-intensive firms. Human capital is naturally more difficult to value than are the physical 
assets of the firm, and the possibility of employee turnover presents a major risk to the acquirer. 
In addition, when the target’s assets are hard to value, the acquirer must often rely on the target’s 
management for critical information. Giammarino and Heinkel (1986) provide a theoretical 
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development. Coff (1999) shows empirically that buyers are more likely to seek information 
from targets when the target is in a more information-intensive industry. Retaining the target’s 
management makes it much more likely that this information is truthfully revealed. 
Acquisitions of Public versus Private Targets 
 The analysis of acquisitions of private targets has been a recent area of research. 
However, comparisons between the performance of public and private acquisitions are 
complicated by the fact that analysts and investors more closely scrutinize public targets. Thus, 
they may be subject to takeover speculation, which could cause a run-up in the stock price and a 
higher final takeover premium.7 In addition, analysts have considerable data available when 
offering their opinions of the acquisition of a public firm. For private targets, in almost all cases 
the analyst is forced to rely on management’s information, which makes it highly unlikely that 
the analyst is able to render a negative opinion on the proposed takeover. 
 Chang (1998) confirms the usual stock versus cash finding for acquisitions of publicly 
traded firms; i.e., a negative and significant price reaction for stock offers and a negative and 
insignificant price reaction for cash offers. For acquisitions of private firms however, he finds 
that, although the market reaction to the cash offers is insignificant, the market reaction to stock 
offers is positive and highly significant. He attributes these positive returns to a monitoring story; 
the emergence of a large blockholder improves the target’s efficiency. Fuller et al. (2002) using a 
time frame matching ours, find that the returns to acquisitions of private targets are significantly 
positive. Returns to acquirers of public targets, in contrast are negative and significant, especially 
when the transaction is financed by stock. Moeller et al. (2004), using dollar abnormal returns,8 
also show that acquisitions of private firms have higher returns than public acquisitions. 
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When the target has a significant non-tangible component (such as management), there can be 
substantial disagreement about target value. Kohers and Ang (2000) discuss the use of earnouts9 
made by bidders to target shareholders as a way of binding target management. They estimate 
the announcement effect of an earnout of 1.36 percent. They find no significant differences 
arising from the acquirer’s choice of financing mechanism.10 
Retention of Management 
 Human capital (target management) is naturally more difficult to value11 than are the 
physical assets of the firm and the possibility of employee turn- over12 presents a major risk to 
the acquirer. The studies that analyze the issue of retained management do not reach a clear 
consensus on the value of retaining management. Matsusaka (1993) focuses on the motivation 
for mergers during and after the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s. The majority of 
the mergers examined involve privately owned targets and all mergers are in part stock-financed. 
He finds that acquirers realize positive announcement-period returns from inter-industry 
(diversifying) mergers and negative returns from intra-industry (related) mergers.13 He further 
finds that target management could be a key asset in a diversification acquisition, since the 
market reacts positively (negatively) to bidders that retain (remove) target management. This 
result suggests that acquirers who replace target management may either overpay, or 
overestimate their own abilities. Coff (2002) makes the point that human capital is a key aspect 
of many acquisitions and empirically demonstrates that it materially affects the probability of a 
transaction being completed. In contrast to Matsusaka (1993), Hubbard and Palia (1999) do not 
find a significant impact of management retention on acquirer returns in their analysis of the 
conglomerate mergers wave of the 1960s.14 
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REIT Mergers 
 REIT merger studies have reached no consensus on the benefits to the acquirer from the 
acquisition of the properties of another REIT or the REIT itself. These articles have tended to 
concentrate on the announcement effect rather than on short- and long-term performance. 
 Allen and Sirmans (1987), in contrast to the usual merger result, find a significant 
positive reaction to the acquirer’s equity on the announcement date. They posit (but do not test) 
that this result is due to the acquirer’s ability to identify superior management skill. In their 
sample almost all of the acquisitions are private firms. Glascock, Davidson, and Sirmans (1991) 
find that both buyers and sellers of real estate are more likely to receive a positive reaction to an 
acquisition announcement when they are acquiring property rather than a real estate division or a 
subsidiary. In contrast, McIntosh, Ott, and Liang (1995) find that the acquisition of real property 
by REITs does not result in positive wealth effects. Elayan and Young (1994) extend Allen and 
Sirmans’ (1987) examination of the sources of gains to target shareholders. They find that 
acquisitions that result in a change of control (i.e., if the acquisition results in the bidder’s control 
of over 50 percent of the target’s outstanding shares) earn larger excess returns than acquisitions 
where no change in control occurs. 
 Researchers have also found that the manner in which a real estate merger is financed has 
a significant impact on acquirer returns. Campbell, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2001) determine that 
the announcement effect of a REIT merger financed with stock is less negative than the 
corresponding announcement for a non-REIT merger. They attribute this result to the different 
signal conveyed by a REIT merger versus the typical corporate merger. Campbell, Ghosh, and 
Sirmans, analyzing stock-financed REIT acquisitions of private firms, find a significant positive 
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relation between returns and the target lockout period, consistent with an information asymmetry 
story. 
 Ambrose, Ehrlich, Hughes, and Wachter (2000) study whether efficiency and 
informational gains result from increased size, brand imaging, or from geographic specialization. 
The authors find no benefits associated with REIT consolidation.15 Hardin and Wolverton (1999) 
address the issue of takeovers of private firms and conjecture that the rapid growth of REITs 
during the 1990s led them to overpay for their acquisitions. They find that acquisition of private 
firms yield poor results.16 
 
Data 
Sample Design and Data 
 We use Lexis-Nexis, NAREIT Statistical Digest, Securities Data Corporation (SDC), and 
SNL REIT databases to assemble a list of all REITs that are either the acquirer or the target in a 
merger from 1990 to 1999. We obtain information on the price, return, and the number of shares 
outstanding from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. Balance sheet 
and income statement data for each firm are obtained from Compustat and SNL REIT databases. 
We gather information on the merger characteristics from the proxy statements, 10Ks, and news 
articles from the Dow Jones News Retrieval and Lexis-Nexis. We verified each announcement 
date taken from SDC with the information in Lexis-Nexis and SNL REIT databases. We 
determine the financing structure of the merger by estimating the percentages of each financing 
mechanism used in each transaction. 
 We exclude REITs from our study if any of the following conditions apply: (i) the 
publicly traded company is not in the CRSP or Compustat database, (ii) the transaction value of 
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the merger is below $2 million, (iii) the acquirer or target is a foreign company, (iv) the exact 
announcement date could not be determined, or (v) the transaction was hostile.17 The resulting 
database of REIT mergers also captures the retention of target management. We classified a 
transaction as retaining management if the majority of the target’s senior management takes on 
significant operating positions in the merged company. For example, we do not consider 
transactions in which the target’s management is offered a seat on the board of directors as, in 
and of itself, signifying the retention of management. These awards are often given as 
compensation for being removed from an operating position. 
 
Estimation Approaches 
 Our initial estimations focus on the market reaction and abnormal stock price 
performance when there is a merger announcement. In the second part, we calculate two 
performance measures. The first is Tobin’s Q, which we define as 
𝑄𝑄 = Share price × shares outstanging + total assets − book equityTotal assets  
 The second measure is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, which is the holding-period return over t trading days 
less the return over the same period on a value-weighted index of seasoned REITs. 
 We designate the announcement date as 𝐴𝐴 = −1 in event time. We denote the 
announcement period of interest, the two-day period that includes the announcement day and the 
day following as 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,0). We use standard event study methodology (following Brown & 
Warner, 1985) and assume security returns are driven by a single-index market model,18 given by 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
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where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the return for security i on day 𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the return on a benchmark index on day 𝐴𝐴, 
and 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are market model coefficients. We compute daily abnormal returns for each firm 
between 𝐴𝐴 = −3 and 𝐴𝐴 = 3 in event time as 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − (𝑎𝑎�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ?̂?𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the abnormal return for firm 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝐴𝐴. The right-hand side is the realized return 
net of the estimated market model return. For each firm 𝑖𝑖, we estimate the market model 
coefficients using daily returns for the period 𝐴𝐴 = (−125,−4; 4,125). For each day 𝐴𝐴 = (−3,3), 




where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of firms. We then compute the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) by summing the AAR over differing observation intervals. In the absence of abnormal 
performance, the expected values of AAR and CAAR are zero. 
 Test statistics for AAR and CAAR are based on the average standardized abnormal return 




𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏
𝑗𝑗=𝑎𝑎1
 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, the square root of firm 𝑖𝑖’s estimated forecast variance, is given by 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 �1 + 1𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + (𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2∑ (𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘=1 � 
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where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 is the residual variance for firm i from the regression in Eq. (2); 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is the number of 
observations for firm i in the comparison period; 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the real estate index return on day t of 
the event period; 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 is the mean real estate index return for the comparison period; 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 is the 
index return for day k of the comparison period. 
 Assuming cross-sectional independence, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, is asymptotically normal with mean zero 
and variance 1/𝑁𝑁. The statistics 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 are unit normal. We use these statistics to test the 
null hypothesis that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 equal zero, where 
𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = √𝑁𝑁 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
and 
𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 = √𝑁𝑁� 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
√𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎 − 1𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡=𝑎𝑎  
We check the robustness of the event study results by using different windows for estimating 
market model parameters, and by adjusting for nonsynchronous trading using the estimation 
procedure described in Scholes and Williams (1977). Results in all cases are similar and are 
available on request. 
Empirical Results 
Sample Characteristics 
 Table 1 shows the distribution of acquisitions in our sample over the 11- year observation 
period. There is a substantial amount of clustering; of the 763 observations that have data 
available on the transaction size, 424 occur in the 1997-1998 window. Of the total sample, 156 
involve the acquisition of property and management. These acquisitions are, on average, 
considerably smaller than the acquisitions of property only. In each of the years in which there 
are sufficient data, this difference is statistically significant. The distribution of transactions 
between acquisitions of property only and property and management is relatively stable over 
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time. Transaction values increase quickly over the decade, beginning with an average target size 
of $24.3 million in 1990 and ending with an average target size of $356.3 million in 2000. 
Insert Table 1 
 Table 2 presents the financial characteristics of the acquiring REITs. The table shows that 
there are no important differences among the acquirers classified by acquisition type. This 
conclusion also holds if we break the sample into acquisitions of property versus property and 
management, or if we partition by financing mechanism. For example, the average value of 
acquirer assets ranges only from $879.7 million in the cash — acquire property only category to 
$1,092 million in the stock — acquire property only category. This similarity in asset values 
suggests that the following results will not be significantly influenced by differences in acquirer 
size or profitability. 
Insert Table 2 
Event Study Results 
 We find a significant positive announcement effect consistent with that of Allen and 
Sirmans (1987). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 show the CAAR values and associated significance 
statistics for various event time windows for the entire sample of 1,538 companies. The 
acquirer’s CAAR for the two-day announcement period 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,0) is 1.48 percent, which is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This figure implies that the announcement of a 
merger conveys positive information to the market. The CAAR for the period 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,1) is 1.73 
percent, which is again significant at the 1 percent level. Consistent with market efficiency, the 
acquirer’s CAAR for the period 𝐴𝐴 = (−5,−2) is 0.06 percent, which is not statistically 
significant (𝑍𝑍-value = 1.0). For the five days after the announcement 𝐴𝐴 = (1,5), the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is 0.31 
percent and again is insignificant. 
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 From this set of 1,538 firms, only 763 have sufficient financial information to measure 
long-term performance. We use this sample in the remainder of our analysis. Columns 4 through 
7 of Table 3 test the announcement effects separately for targets that are private before the 
announcement of the acquisitions and for all publicly traded targets. By partitioning our sample, 
we can see whether Allen and Sirmans’ (1987) findings are driven primarily by the acquisition of 
private firms since almost all of the acquisitions in their data are private firms. For takeovers of 
public firms (columns 6 and 7) the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 values are all negative and insignificant except for the (−3,3) window, which is significantly negative at the .10 level. In contrast, the announcement 
effects for acquisitions of private targets are all positive and significant in each of the 
observation periods containing the announcement date. The largest abnormal return, 1.76 
percent, corresponds to the shortest observation window: (−1,0). This finding is consistent with 
our underlying hypothesis: acquisitions of public firms, because of the difficulty in obtaining an 
informational advantage, should have a lower announcement effect than acquisitions of private 
targets. This result also provides a different interpretation of Allen and Sirmans’ (1987) findings; 
their positive announcement effect result is influenced by the fact that their sample is almost 
exclusively private acquisitions. 
Insert Table 3 
 To investigate whether our results are influenced by the method of financing the merger, 
we partition our sample into three groups in Table 4. The first group includes acquisitions that 
finance over 50 percent of the total transaction using cash; the second group contains 
acquisitions that finance over 50 percent of the total transaction using common stock. The third 
group consists of the remaining transactions, including many that use other funding sources, 
primarily debt. In our data set, these groups are roughly equal in size. For acquisitions of public 
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targets the three groups contain 24, 36, and 34 observations, respectively. For the private 
acquisitions, the three groups contain 150, 142, and 132 observations, respectively. 
 The results summarized in Table 4 are quite different than those obtained by Chang 
(1998) or Fuller et al. (2002) and Burns, Francis, and Hasan (2007) for regular corporate mergers 
and Campbell et al. (2001) for REIT mergers. Rather than finding that stock transactions have a 
more positive announcement effect, we discover that the financing mechanism has little effect on 
the results reported in Table 3. For public targets, again the results are all insignificant. For 
private targets, the results are all positive and significant for time periods that include the 
announcement date. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the announcement effects are similar across 
each of the three financing mechanisms. 
Insert Table 4 
 
Insert Table 5 
 Table 5 presents the most important results in this study. It displays the announcement 
effects of acquirers given different degrees of transparency of the target firm: acquire the 
property only of a public target, acquire property and management of a public target, acquire 
property only of a private target, and finally acquire property and management of a private 
target. It also focuses more precisely on acquisitions of property only (607 transactions, 32 
involving public targets) versus acquisitions of both property and management (156 transactions, 
72 public). Our results for public versus private acquisitions are comparable to those obtained 
previously for more general samples of firms. In the short term, private acquisitions produce 
positive and significant returns, but public acquisitions produce negative and insignificant 
returns. For private acquisitions involving only property, we find that the announcement effects 
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are positive and significant at the .10 level for the (−1,0) and (−1,1) performance windows. For 
public acquisitions involving only property, we find that for all performance windows the 
abnormal returns are negative and insignificant. When a firm acquires both the property and the 
management of private targets, the performance windows containing the announcement date 
have positive and significant returns. For firms that acquire the property and the management of 
public firms, the returns are similar, but significant only for 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,0) and 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,1). 
 These abnormal returns suggest that acquisitions that include management earn more 
positive abnormal returns for both private and public acquisitions. Thus, our data support our 
basic hypothesis on the ordering of these four classes of transactions. Our results differ from 
Matsusaka (1993) since we find that a premium can exist for mergers within the same industry 
(“related” acquisitions) if target management is retained. However, our finding that including 
target management can yield positive abnormal returns for public acquisitions is in agreement 
with Matsusaka (1993) since his study deals primarily with private acquisitions. 
 To verify that our results in Table 5 do not depend on the financing mechanism we look 
at acquisitions of property versus property and management by financing mechanism in Table 6. 
As noted in the first section, previous research concerning the value of stock versus cash 
financing is inconclusive. For each of the financing mechanism we find results consistent with 
Table 5. Transactions involving management have higher returns, in both magnitude and 
statistical significance, than do transactions involving only property. The abnormal returns for 
acquisitions of property only are weakly significant, although almost all are positive. For the 
observation windows 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,0) and 𝐴𝐴 = (−1,1), the announcement effects are positive and 
significant at the .05 level for acquisitions of property and management. These announcement 
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effects show that one of our key results, that acquisitions involving management produce higher 
announcement effects, is robust to the acquirer’s choice of financing mechanism. 
 A further issue is whether or not the size of the acquisition influences the announcement 
effect. This is indirectly a test of the Hubbard and Palia (1999) finding that positive gains can 
occur when targets are capital constrained. Since relatively few of our acquirers have debt 
ratings, and those that do have, with almost no exceptions a BBB-rating, we use target size as a 
proxy for access to capital. We partition the 104 public targets in our sample into acquisitions of 
property only versus property and management in Table 7. We then split each of these groups 
into halves based on target size. The abnormal returns over each of the performance windows are 
similar for small and large targets, although, as we expected, the returns are generally slightly 
higher for larger targets. This result suggests that the target’s access to capital does not drive our 
main results. 
Insert Table 6 
 
Insert Table 7 
Long-Term Performance 
 We next investigate whether our short-run performance results are valid in the longer 
term. We use Tobin’s Q as our primary performance metric; return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) serve as robustness checks. For all acquirers in the sample, Table 8 shows that 
the Tobin’s Q of the acquiring REIT increases in the two years following the merger and then 
levels off. Operating performance (as measured by return on assets, return on book equity, and 
sales to assets) increases in each of the first three years following the acquisition. These Q values 
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suggest that on average, the long-term operating performance of acquirers improves after the 
transaction. 
Insert Table 8 
 
Insert Table 9 
 Table 9, rows 3 and 4, show the Tobin’s Q of transactions by property only versus 
property and management. In each of years one through three after the merger, Tobin’s Q is 
higher for acquisitions that include management. In the year following the acquisition, the Q for 
acquisitions of only property is 1.11 compared with 1.44 for acquisitions of property and 
management. This difference increases over the two following years. Rows 5 and 6 of Table 9 
display the same comparison for transactions involving private versus public targets. Again, we 
see that in each of the three years after the merger, Tobin’s Q is higher for private targets. In the 
year following the acquisition, the Q for acquisitions of public targets is 1.12 compared with 1.31 
for private targets. Unlike the prior result, this difference does not increase, but instead remains 
constant in the following years. These observations are consistent with those obtained for short-
term abnormal performance. However, the long-term results should be interpreted with some 
caution. The differences are small relative to the high estimated standard deviations so that these 
differences are not statistically significant. Secondly, the Qs of the acquirers in the year prior to 
the merger differ across the various types of targets, ranging from 0.87 for acquirers of public 
firms to 1.10 for acquirers of property and management. The average change in Q from the year 
prior to three years after is 0.27 for property only, 0.92 for property and management, 0.42 for 
private targets, and 0.39 for public targets. 
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 To verify that the conclusions of Table 9 are robust to the financing of the transaction, 
Table 10 looks at Tobin’s Q one and three years after the merger according to the financing 
mechanism and type of acquisition. In each case, although the figures are much closer for 
transactions using a combination of financing methods, private acquisitions have higher Qs than 
do public transactions; acquisitions involving management have a higher Q than do acquisitions 
of only property. The Q values one year after the merger are 0.67, 0.21, and -0.01 higher for 
purchases of property versus property and management for cash, stock, and mixed transactions, 
respectively. The Q values three years after the merger are 0.57, 0.15, and 0.24 higher for 
purchases of property versus property and management for cash, stock, and mixed transactions, 
respectively. The Q values one year after the merger are 0.81, 0.37, and 0.01 higher for private 
targets versus public targets and management for cash, stock, and mixed transactions, 
respectively. The Q values three year after the merger are 1.00, 0.46, and 0.04 higher for private 
versus public targets for cash, stock, and mixed transactions, respectively. Thus, the advantages 
of private versus public and retaining management are substantial and appear to be greater over 
the longer horizon. 
Insert Table 10 
 
Insert Table 11 
 To further check the robustness of these results, we replace Tobin’s Q with return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as the performance measure. The first row of Table 11 
shows the average ROA over the entire sample for the merger year and one to five years after the 
merger. Overall, the ROA rises from the merger year value of 4.28 to a peak value of 5.59 four 
years after the merger. The average increase in Q from the merger year to the year following is 
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substantial, 0.64, again suggesting that overall these mergers are beneficial to the acquirer. We 
also observe this increase in each of the four subgroups. The values are 0.78, 0.78, 0.66, and 0.86 
for property only, property and management, private, and public targets, respectively. The 
highest ROA in the post-merger year, 5.45, corresponds to acquisitions of both property and 
management. The lowest value is 4.81 for acquisitions of property only. After the first post-
merger year, the increases in Q are much smaller for each of the four groups. As in the prior 
table, these results are influenced by the fact that the ROAs of the acquirers in the year prior to 
the merger differ substantially across the various types of targets, ranging from 2.97 for acquirers 
of public firms to 4.96 for acquirers of property and management. The average change in ROA 
from the year prior to three years after is 1.38 for property only, 0.83 for property and 
management, 1.07 for private targets, and 2.37 for public targets. Thus while acquisitions of 
property and management result in the highest average ROA in each of the years following the 
merger, these acquirers had substantially higher ROAs prior to the merger. 
Insert Table 12 
 Table 12 repeats this analysis using ROE as the performance measure. Consistent with 
the prior results where we measure performance by Q, private acquisitions have a higher post-
merger ROE than do public transactions and acquisitions involving management have a higher 
post-merger ROE than do acquisitions of only property. Again however, these results are 
confounded by the observation that the performance of firms acquiring property only and 
acquiring public firms was weaker prior to the merger. While this observation makes the 
interpretation of the long-term ROA and ROE of acquirers less precise, it hints at an interesting 
area for potential future research. Tables 11 and 12 suggest that better performing REITs tend to 
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acquire private targets and to retain management. Consistent with a hubris theory, managers who 
may be overconfident of their ability tend to acquire public targets and only property. 
Insert Table 13 
 Finally, to gauge the long-term impact of retaining management on the acquirer’s Q, 
Table 13 reports the results of a regression that uses Q in years one through three after the 
transaction as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the log of assets, the sales-
to-assets ratio, leverage, and a dummy for the retention of management. The F-statistics of the 
resulting regressions are all significant at the .01 level and the adjusted 𝐴𝐴2s average about 16 
percent, and decline with a lengthening horizon. In each of the regressions the dummy 
coefficient for management retention is positive and significant at the .05 level, indicating that 
the retention of management has a significant impact on the acquirer’s long-term performance. 
This result reinforces our hypothesis that acquirers can have an informational advantage in the 
acquisition and retention of a target’s management. Our finding also tends to support the 
“managerial synergy” theory that management of the acquirer wanted to work with target 
management. This result further suggests that the role of mergers as a way of disciplining 
management may not be a significant factor in our data. 
 
Conclusions 
 Our paper investigates the merger hypothesis that short-run and long-term performance 
of the acquirer is higher the less transparent (more difficult to value) the target’s assets. Assets 
are harder to value when the acquisition involves human capital, most notably target 
management and/or when the firm to be acquired is private. Human capital (target management) 
is naturally more difficult to value than are the physical assets of the firm and the possibility of 
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employee turnover presents a major risk to the acquirer. Thus, the highest returns should come 
from acquiring the management and assets of a private company. Conversely, the lowest returns 
should result from acquiring the physical assets of a publicly traded firm. 
 To test this hypothesis, we examine a total of 1,538 friendly acquisitions by public REITs 
between January 1990 and December 2000. To make our measures of performance less sensitive 
to variation due to industry differences and to avoid diversifying mergers, we use only 
acquisitions within the real estate area. Our empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that 
acquisition performance is linked to the difficulty in assessing the target’s value. Using the 
standard event study approach with a REIT index as the benchmark to measure short-term 
reactions, we find that acquisitions of public firms have negative and insignificant short-term 
abnormal performance. Acquisitions of private targets have positive and significant short-term 
abnormal performance. Abnormal returns are higher when the acquisitions of private firms 
include acquisition of the firm’s management. These results are paralleled when we analyze the 
acquirer’s Q over the three years following the merger. Our conclusions are robust to the type of 
financing (cash, stock, or a combination) used in the acquisition. In addition, when we regress 
the Q of an acquirer on a set of REIT characteristics we find that a dummy variable representing 
the retention of management is positive and significant. These findings suggest that for our set of 
acquisitions, takeovers are not extensively used as a disciplining measure. 
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Notes 
1. See Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2003) for an analysis of the impact of REIT governance 
structure on firm valuation at the IPO date. Daines (2001) discusses the positive impact on Q 
stemming from incorporation in Delaware. This fact has been often observed in the popular 
press. For example, as Porter (1997) cites: there will be three types of REIT M&A. There will be 
the truly friendly one, the somewhat friendly deals — the hostile ones that become ‘friendly’ 
once the takeover price is raised to the target’s satisfaction and management is brought on board 
— and the outright hostile ones. The majority of REIT deals will be consensual by the time they 
are public.” 
2. Hasan, Kallberg, and Liu (2002) find that although the average size of public targets grew 
rapidly during the 1990s from an average of about $43 million in the beginning of the decade to 
averages approaching $1 billion at the end of the decade, the size of the target relative to its 
acquirer remained relatively constant at about 37 percent. For more details on REIT M&As, see 
Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012). 
3. Allen and Sirmans (1987) analyze the relevance of classic corporate merger motives to 
REITs. 
4. Schwert (2000) finds that the takeover premia in a hostile transaction are between 9 and 15 
percent higher than in a friendly transaction. 
5. Schlingemann (2004) examines the source of takeover capital (rather than the payment 
mechanism) and finds positive announcement-period returns only for acquirers using equity 
financing. 
6. See also Healey, Palepu, and Ruback (1997). 
7. The relation between run-up and merger premium is studied in Schwert (1996). 
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8. See Malatesta (1983). 
9. Earnouts, which offer payments conditional on the merged firm’s future performance, help 
resolve agency and informational asymmetry problems, since, presumably, only high-value 
managers will agree to defer part of the merger premium. Kohers and Ang analyze 938 mergers 
that include earnouts: 620 private (with an average value of $10.4 million); 275 were divested 
subs (with an average value of $27.2 million). In our data set, there are relatively few, if any 
earnouts. In a conversation with Robin Panovka, an attorney with Wachtel, Lipton in New York 
City, who specializes in REIT mergers, he also noted that earnouts aren’t typically found in 
REIT merger deals although the merger consideration can includes contingent value rights 
(CVRs) but these are very difficult to value and are accorded little weight in the merger. 
10. The literature dealing with stock financing as an incentive mechanism is also relevant 
here; see, i.a., Osano (2004). 
11. Giammarino and Heinkel (1986) provide a theoretical development. 
12. Martin and McConnell (1991) show that tender offers (typically a criterion for classifying 
a merger as hostile) lead to high levels of management turnover. Shivdasani (1993) also 
documents the high levels of management turnover following a hostile takeover. As Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, 1989) suggest, hostile mergers are typically disciplinary, while 
friendly mergers are generally motivated by synergy gains. 
13. Matsusaka (1993) defines a “diversification acquisition” as one in which the acquirer and 
the target have different two-digit SIC codes. If both the acquirer and target have the same two-
digit SIC code then he defines this as a “related acquisition.” 
14. In their sample over 75 percent of the acquisitions retained management. 
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15. This finding is in direct conflict with the popular press and well-known REIT managers, 
such as Sam Zell, who have extolled REIT mergers as a way to achieve economies of scale. 
They assert that larger REITs have better access to funds, lower overhead costs, etc. 
16. See Corgel, McIntosh, and Ott (1995), Choi, Francis, and Hasan (2010), Ongena and 
Penas (2009), and Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2012) for related discussion. 
17. Eight of the transactions in our sample were flagged by SDC as hostile, i.e., involving a 
tender offer, but public sources did not confirm these classifications. Rerunning our analysis 
omitting these eight observations leads to no relevant differences in our results. 
18. The issue of the efficiency of single- versus multiple-factor model in explaining REIT 
returns is analyzed in Kallberg, Liu, and Trzcinka (2000). They find that a single-factor model 
using a REIT index can explain approximately 85 percent of REIT returns and that the marginal 
contribution of additional factors (such as the Fama—French factors) is minimal. 
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Table 1. Frequency Distribution. 
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 Table 5. Merger Announcement Effects and Acquisition Type. 
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 Table 7. Responses of Prices to Merger Announcements According to Acquisition Type. 
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 Table 8. Long-Term Performance of the Acquirer. 
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 Table 11. Return on Assets by Acquisition Type. 
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